Kim v. Lakeside Adult Family Home
185 Wn.2d 532 – 374 P.3d 121 – 2016 Wash. LEXIS 585
Appeal from Snohomish County Superior Court. 12-2-02012-2. Honorable George F. Appel.
Kim v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, 186 Wn. App. 398, 345 P.3d 850, 2015 Wash. App.
Facts
This case involves three distinct areas of law, two of which are related to service of process. Those areas are:
- Does the abuse of vulnerable adults act (AVAA), chapter 74.34 RCW, create an implied cause of action against mandated reporters who fail to report abuse?
- Was service made on a Norwegian defendant served properly under the Hague Convention?
- Did the statute of limitations expire before the Norwegian defendant was served?
This article will only deal with item #3.
TOLLING OF STATUTE – RCW 4.16.170
For the purpose of tolling any statute of limitations an action shall be deemed commenced when the complaint is filed or summons is served whichever occurs first. If service has not been had on the defendant prior to the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff shall cause one or more of the defendants to be served personally, or commence service by publication within ninety days from the date of filing the complaint. If the action is commenced by service on one or more of the defendants or by publication, the plaintiff shall file the summons and complaint within ninety days from the date of service. If following service, the complaint is not so filed, or following filing, service is not so made, the action shall be deemed to not have been commenced for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations.
Judicial History
In the Sidis case, the King County Superior Court granted a summary judgment in favor of all three defendants and the case was dismissed for lack of service. The plaintiff appealed and the Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal due to lack of timely service.
In the Clark case the trial court denied a summary judgment request from the defendant. The defendant appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s holding and dismissed the case due to lack of timely service. The plaintiff appealed the summary judgment to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court’s decision.
The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court which reversed the dismissal by the lower courts.
Specific Issues
- In judicial interpretation of statutes, the first rule is “the court should assume that the legislature means exactly what it says. Plain words do not require construction.” Should the court interpret the wording of the stature as being ambiguous? No
- In a case with multiple defendants, does service on one or more defendants within the statute of limitations (and within the 90 days of filing if applicable which it was in this case) toll the statute of limitations on the remaining unserved defendants? Yes
- Must a plaintiff proceed in a timely manner to serve unserved defendants or risk losing the right to proceed against them if the served defendant(s) are dismissed? Yes
Holdings
RCW 4.16.170 is not ambiguous.
Review of case was granted on one issue only: that being whether, under RCW 4.16.170, service of process on one defendant tolls the statute of limitation as to unserved defendants. The Supreme Court held it does toll the statute.
Reasoning
The purpose of the statute of limitations is to compel actions to be commenced within what the legislature deemed to be a reasonable time, and not postponed indefinitely. However, the statute’s operation could be tolled for what the legislature regarded as a good reason.
Strictly speaking, any tolling statute “effectively negate[s] the purpose of a statute of limitations”. Here, the Legislature could well have reasoned that plaintiffs in multidefendant actions should receive this extra protection from the harsh effects of the statute of limitation.
It is arguably unfair to require a plaintiff to serve all defendants within a set limitation period, when it may be difficult or impossible to determine the actual location of some defendants before discovery is underway. Statutes of limitation are procedural rules that are properly the realm of the Legislature, and the fairness of such statutes should generally be left to the Legislature to determine.
In judicial interpretation of statutes, the first rule is “the court should assume that the legislature means exactly what it says. Plain words do not require construction.”
The statute regarding the commencement of a civil action is RCW 4.16.170 and says in part: “If the action is commenced by service on one or more of the defendants…” The Supreme Court interpreted this language exactly as it is written and ruled that since one of the defendants had been served the case had been commenced thus effectively tolling the statute of limitations on the unserved defendants.
C4PSE Comment
This is one of the most important rulings in the history of modern process serving in Washington. It is not at all unusual for process servers to receive service assignments where the final deadline for service is within the 90 day tolling period afforded by RCW 4.16.170. This is especially worrisome in regards an auto tort or other personal injury case.
Sidis provides that in multiple defendant cases, service on one of the defendants tolls the statute of limitations in regards all other defendants. This tolling is in effect so long as the served defendant is not dismissed from the case before the remaining defendant(s) are served.
In a multiple defendant situation facing a statute of limitations it is best to get all of the defendants served before the statute expires. However, as noted by the court, this is not always possible.